



:

.

.

.

.

(13) 5



(- -)



“

:

:

-:

(1)

)

(2)

(3)

()

-

(13) 5



...

,

(4)

.

.

.

.

(5)

.



.

.

.

.

. (6)

(())

. (7)

. (8)



.

.

.

(9)

.

)

(

-:

))

,

,



$\cdot^{(10)}(($

.

.

$_{-}^{(11)}:$

/

-1

(

)

(

)

.

:

/

-2

(

)

:

/

-3

(13) 5



·
:
/
-4

·
:
/
-5

·
:
/
-6

·
"

·

·

·

·



.

:

"

"

()

.

2003 /4/9

.

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

(12)

.



"

(13)

.

()

.

"

-:

(())

((

))

))



)) (()) ((
) () ((
() (

.
.

(14)
.

"

.
(15)
.

2005

2005

(16)
.



(())
))
(
2005 28

'
(⁽¹⁷⁾

()

" %95
- / (10)
()
- -
)
(
" " ()
()
()



، ،

، ()

، ،

، ،

(18)

، ،
%80 ، ،

، ،

.1921 23

،

، ،
)

.(

،

،

(13) 5



(19)

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

1992

(20)

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'



(())
(21)))
(())

(22)

(())
(23) (())
-:

(13) 5



(24)

-;

-

((' ' ' '))

,

.

,

,

,

.

,

.

,

.



1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



Abstract

We discusses the “ethnic paradigm” that currently prevails in analyses of Iraqi history and politics. While acknowledging the strong forces associated with ethnic and sectarian loyalties in the country, we points to three important indicators of the surviving Iraqi nationalist sentiment that cut across these ethno-sectarian categories. It highlights the misfit between Western approaches to Iraqi politics and indigenous Iraqi political thinking on ethnicity and sectarianism, and pays special attention to the implications for the debates about Iraqi unite.



- (1) - / - -
- (2) .37 2005 1 / -
- (3) .12 ,2008/2/12 1319 ,
- (4) .63 ,
- (5) .63 ,2005 311 , , ,
- (6) .64
- (7) .10 ,2006/ 326 , , ,
- (8) .28 ,2004 551 , , ,
- (9) .28 ,
- 591 , , ,
- (10) .26 2008
- (11) .12 , ,
- (12) .43 , . .
- (13) .2008/2/3 , , ,
- (14) .28 , , . .
- (15) .29 ,
- (16))
- (17) .107 , - 2006 , , (
- (18) /2005
- (19) .103 , ,
- (20) : ,
- (21) .63 ,2003 ,297 ,
- 1 -1990 -1914 ,
- (22) .317 ,
- (23) . ,198 2 , ,15 ,
- (24) 198 ,